MTPM Notes: nuovo articolo 22/11/2026
Several years have passed since I finished reading Vladimir Jankélévitch's Death. I could not say exactly when that book began to change the way I think. Certain works do not bring sudden revelations. Instead, they work slowly, planting questions that continue to resurface long after the final page has been turned. Since then, the relationship between death, ownership, and memory has become a recurring subject of reflection for me, one that has developed over the years without ever arriving at definitive conclusions. Some books provide us with answers; others deprive us of the comfort of those we thought we already possessed. For me, Jankélévitch's belongs to the latter category.
Death is a certainty we acknowledge without ever truly comprehending it. We can witness the deaths of others, describe their causes, study their consequences, but our own death remains an event we will never be able to recount as a completed experience. Whenever we attempt to imagine our own absence, we almost inevitably picture ourselves still present, spectators of a world in which, by definition, we will no longer exist. We know that our existence will come to an end, yet we cannot conceive of that ending without continuing, if only for an instant, to exist within the very thought that contemplates it. It is a contradiction difficult to overcome, and perhaps it helps explain the ease with which we organize our everyday lives. We pursue ambitions, accumulate possessions, make plans, as though the conclusion of it all belonged to a horizon distant enough to be ignored. Not necessarily out of superficiality, but because living beneath the constant weight of our own mortality would probably be unbearable.
From this contradiction has emerged a conviction that has grown increasingly firm over the years: everything we own is ours only temporarily, and, in all likelihood, even the memory we leave behind will endure for far less time than we would like to imagine.
We spend a considerable portion of our lives acquiring things. We desire them, choose them, compare them, pay for them, take care of them. We devote years to obtaining them and just as many to maintaining, improving, or replacing them. Our homes, cars, furniture, books, and musical instruments gradually become elements of our identity, material expressions of the tastes, achievements, and aspirations that define us. Ownership thus acquires a meaning that extends beyond the mere possession of an object: it seems to lend substance to our presence in the world, as though surrounding ourselves with things capable of enduring might confer upon us some measure of their apparent permanence.
Yet ownership, however firmly established in law, remains a condition bounded by time. We may purchase an object, use it as we please, assign it monetary or sentimental value; what we cannot do is free our relationship with it from mortality. Sooner or later, that relationship will end, while the object itself may continue to exist, passing through other hands, other homes, other histories. The house into which we have poured our resources, sacrifices, and dreams may one day shelter people we will never know. The furniture will be kept, sold, or discarded. Collections assembled over years of painstaking searching may be scattered in the course of a single afternoon. Some will appreciate their value; others will see nothing more than things to be sorted out or cleared away. Not necessarily out of insensitivity, but because sentimental value is not an intrinsic property of objects. It arises from the relationship we establish with them, and that relationship cannot be transferred along with ownership.
I think, for instance, of a piano. An instrument may accompany a musician for decades, becoming the silent witness to thousands of hours of practice, to moments of insight, frustration, discovery, and artistic achievement. The pianist comes to know its every nuance, every imperfection, every tonal characteristic. How it responds beneath the fingers, what sonorities it can produce, what resistance must be overcome. A familiarity develops between the instrument and the person who plays it, one that goes far beyond mere mechanical knowledge, until the piano becomes something like an extension of the musician's own sensibility. Then, one day, that piano moves to another home. To its new owner it will be an instrument, perhaps a magnificent one, but it will not necessarily carry the meaning it held for the person who came before. Another musician will begin to build a personal history upon it, under no obligation to know anything of the one that preceded it. The instrument will go on sounding, indifferent to the succession of people who have owned it.
Perhaps it is precisely this indifference of things that strikes me most. The objects upon which we bestow feelings, memories, and meanings preserve, in themselves, nothing of our relationship with them. We fill them with our lives, and when those lives end, the objects remain simply what they are. It would be easy to draw from this a condemnation of material possessions, but that is not my intention. I love beautiful objects, musical instruments, technology, everything that allows us to deepen a passion or make existence more pleasurable. I do not regard ownership as a fault, nor renunciation as a virtue in itself. What interests me, rather, is the disproportion between the permanence we tend to attribute to our acquisitions and their actual fragility. Ultimately, everything we buy belongs to us, but only on loan from life. And although the loan will inevitably come due, we do not know when.
If this observation seems relatively straightforward when applied to objects, it becomes considerably harder to accept when we extend it to memory. We like to imagine that, once we are gone, we will continue to live in the recollections of those who knew us. Children, grandchildren, friends, students will preserve something of us, symbolically prolonging our presence beyond the limits of biological existence. It is an understandable thought, at times even a necessary one. Yet memory, too, resides in mortal minds. How many of us truly know our great-grandparents? Not merely their names, a date, or a few faded photographs, but the people they were: their personalities, their voices, their habits, convictions, fears, contradictions. And how many could say anything meaningful about their great-great-grandparents beyond a few genealogical facts?
Only a few generations are needed for entire lives to fade almost completely from family memory. People who loved, suffered, desired, worked, confronted conflicts, and made decisions they considered fundamental. They had affections, ambitions, convictions, probably even a certain sense of their own importance. And today, in most cases, we know virtually nothing about them. I find this observation more unsettling than many abstract reflections on death, because it challenges one of our most persistent expectations: that the importance we attach to our existence should somehow correspond to the length of time it remains in memory.
Memory, after all, does not preserve people in their entirety. It reconstructs an image of them through fragments and testimonies, selected and altered by the sensibility of those who remain. Even when we remember someone we knew intimately, we do not possess the whole of that person. We retain what we saw and understood, inevitably filtered through our own experience. As generations succeed one another, that image grows poorer, until a complex personality is reduced to a handful of episodes, a character trait, sometimes merely a name. And even the survival of that name offers no guarantee that anyone will still be able to recognize the person to whom it belonged.
Yet it would be a mistake to confuse disappearance from memory with the insignificance of a life. The death of a stranger may strike us as an impersonal, almost statistical fact; the death of someone we love creates a rupture in our own existence, taking from us someone no one else can replace. Our own death, finally, presents an altogether different question, for it marks the boundary beyond which we can place no personal experience. The disappearance of an individual may leave the course of history entirely unchanged and, at the same time, constitute an irreparable loss for those who loved that person. There is no necessary proportion between someone's public significance and the emptiness their absence may leave behind. Nor does the fact that one day no one will remember a person diminish the authenticity of the love that person received. Each generation creates its own emotional world, and forgetting is not necessarily an act of ingratitude. It is also an inevitable consequence of lives succeeding one another, each with its own bonds, experiences, and memories.
One might argue, then, that what matters is not being remembered, but having left something in the lives of others: a lesson, an example, an act of generosity, a piece of knowledge. I consider this a morally more meaningful perspective than the mere desire for recognition, but it does not entirely resolve the question. A teacher may profoundly influence a student, helping shape the student's thinking and sensibility. That student may, in turn, pass on something of what was received, setting in motion a chain of influences that can no longer be traced to its source. Something may continue to have an effect long after the person who first transmitted it has disappeared, but there is no guarantee that it will endure. More importantly, why should the value of an action depend on its ability to outlive us? Does an act of generosity lose its meaning if no one remembers it? Does a lesson become worthless if its effects end with the life of the person who received it?
It seems to me that behind this longing for permanence lies a desire for immortality that we cannot relinquish, even when we abandon the idea of personal survival. We want something of ourselves to remain, for the future to acknowledge our passage through the world, as though existence, in order to be fully justified, required confirmation from those who come after us.
Art appears to offer an answer to this aspiration. Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and Chopin died centuries ago, yet their works continue to be studied, performed, and heard. But the survival of the work is not the survival of its creator. We do not know Beethoven. We know his compositions; we possess letters, documents, testimonies. We can reconstruct aspects of his personality and attempt to understand his musical thinking, but the person who once existed remains irretrievably beyond our reach. The Beethoven we speak of is also the product of two centuries of interpretation, idealization, and critical reassessment. And for every composer whose name has endured, how many musicians have vanished from collective memory? How many performers devoted their entire lives to music without leaving sufficient evidence for their work to be reconstructed? The history of art is not a complete inventory of the artistic value humanity has produced, but the outcome of a selection process in which the quality of works, historical circumstances, and a considerable element of chance all play a part.
Music, however, suggests something even more interesting. Its existence is inseparable from time, and every performance unfolds through the continuous disappearance of what has just occurred. A phrase begins, develops, leads into the next; the sound we heard a moment ago no longer exists, yet it continues to give meaning to what we are hearing now. Musical form emerges through a succession of irreversible events, which memory holds together without ever being able to restore them to their original state. Even a recording does not preserve the event in its entirety. It allows us to hear an audible record of it, but not to return to the moment in which that performance took place. A concert may be extraordinary and leave no documentary trace whatsoever, without its artistic quality being diminished in the slightest. Time is not merely the dimension in which music unfolds; it is an essential part of its nature. I do not mean to turn transience into an aesthetic virtue, as though something became beautiful simply because it was destined to end. But it seems clear to me that duration alone is no adequate measure of value.
It is here that my reflection returns to a philosophical distinction I consider essential: that between the irreversible and the irrevocable. Time moves in only one direction. We may remember the past, regret it, document it, but we cannot return to it. Irreversibility refers to this impossibility of reversing the course of becoming. Irrevocability introduces a further question: what has been done cannot be transformed into something that never happened. We may repair the consequences of an action, sometimes even erase every material trace of it, but we cannot undo the fact that we performed it. From this perspective, to be forgotten is not the same as never having existed. Time may scatter objects, erase testimonies, gradually extinguish every memory, but it cannot retroactively alter what has occurred. A person may disappear entirely from the knowledge of future generations without making it any less true that they lived, thought, loved, and suffered.
This is not a form of immortality, nor a consolation capable of diminishing the finality of death. The past is not a place in which we continue to exist, but the dimension of what has been and what, precisely because it has been, cannot be retroactively erased. The ending of an existence and the cancellation of the fact that it occurred are two profoundly different matters.
This distinction allows us to confront an inevitable question: if everything is destined to end, why should we attach importance to anything we do? The question rests on an assumption I see no reason to accept: that something must last forever in order to have value. We do not demand that a conversation, a happy day, or an artistic experience produce permanent consequences to justify the time we devoted to it. We recognize its meaning within the life we are living. Why, then, should we apply a different standard to our existence as a whole?
Perhaps the difficulty arises from our habit of treating personal fulfillment as a form of accumulation. We accumulate possessions, knowledge, achievements, recognition, as though the quantity of what we manage to preserve might compensate for the brevity of the time available to us. And when we realize that we cannot hold on to anything indefinitely, we attempt at least to transfer this accumulation into the future, in the form of a material or symbolic legacy. But the future is under no obligation to preserve what we consider important, and perhaps our difficulty in accepting this reveals how deeply we tend to confuse the value of experiences with our ability to retain them.
The world existed before us and will, in all likelihood, continue to exist after us. This observation, for all its apparent banality, ought to prompt us to reconsider many of the matters to which we devote a disproportionate share of our lives. Personal conflicts, professional rivalries, frustrated ambitions, recognition withheld can occupy our thoughts for years, influence decisions, and damage relationships. While we are living through them, they seem decisive, sometimes unbearable. Yet from the perspective of a few generations, most of these events will have lost any recognizable significance. Naturally, their future irrelevance does not erase the pain they may cause in the present. It would be naive to conclude that, because everything will end, nothing deserves to be taken seriously. Mortality does not cancel moral responsibility: avoidable suffering remains suffering even if it is forgotten; an injustice does not become less grave because no one will speak of it a century from now. Rather, awareness of death introduces a distinction between what truly matters and what, through habit, pride, or vanity, we invest with exaggerated importance. We are not always capable of recognizing that distinction, especially when we are personally involved, but perhaps it is worth trying.
I do not know what happens after death, nor do I believe that a question so complex can be settled by a simple assertion. Religious and philosophical traditions offer different answers, which I neither intend to adopt nor to refute in these reflections. The question that interests me is more limited: to understand the extent to which our longing for permanence shapes our relationship with the life before us. For my part, I consider it highly probable that, after a certain number of generations, no one will know who I was. Some recording may survive, a photograph, a document, perhaps some evidence of my work. But the existence of a trace does not mean that anyone will consult it, much less that they will be able to reconstruct the person to whom it belonged. An archive can preserve a name without preserving a living memory. I feel no particular anguish at this prospect. What I find harder to justify is the opposite expectation: that our passage through the world should necessarily deserve a place in the consciousness of those who come after us.
The years I have spent reflecting on these questions have not taught me to accept death serenely, nor have they brought me any particular wisdom. I still love objects, pursue ambitions, and attach importance to matters that probably deserve far less of my attention. An awareness of mortality does not eliminate the contradictions of everyday life; if anything, it makes them more apparent. It has, however, changed the way I think about time. We can accumulate objects, but not the years in which to enjoy them. We can leave possessions to others, but we cannot bequeath the duration of our lives. We can plan for the future, but we cannot guarantee that we will live to see it. And while we struggle to preserve what we own, we consume the one resource whose remaining supply is unknown to us, and which no amount of wealth can restore once it has passed.
There is something paradoxical about the care we take to protect objects from deterioration and the relative carelessness with which we squander our time. We worry about preserving what we may someday lose, overlooking the fact that every passing day already represents an irreversible loss, regardless of how we have spent it. I have no intention of extracting a universal moral lesson from these reflections. I distrust conclusions that presume to teach others how to live, particularly when they concern something so profoundly personal. Nor do I believe that every moment of existence must be turned into an opportunity to be exploited, as though time itself had to submit to the logic of productivity. That would merely be another form of accumulation, perhaps even more oppressive than the first.
What interests me, rather, is freeing the value of a life from the obligation to outlive itself. A person may lead a rich, intelligent, generous, or artistically fruitful existence without leaving any lasting trace. Conversely, the survival of a name does not necessarily demonstrate the moral worth of the person who bore it. History preserves the memory of individuals whom the world might have been better off never encountering, while forgetting countless others whose presence meant something precious to those fortunate enough to know them. Memory is not an impartial tribunal, and oblivion is not a sentence. To entrust the future with the task of justifying the present would mean submitting our existence to a judgment we will never hear, delivered by people from whom we have no right to demand attention.
After all these years, the thought to which I keep returning is this: we have no guarantee of permanence, but that does not render what we experience insubstantial. Death is a genuine rupture, one that no philosophical distinction can abolish. There is no need to soften it with the promise of symbolic survival, nor to credit it with automatically giving meaning to life. The fact that an existence comes to an end does not prove that it was meaningful, but neither does it justify declaring it meaningless. Its finitude and its value are two different questions.
I am not particularly concerned with what may remain of me a hundred or two hundred years from now. What matters far more to me is what I can know, understand, create, and share during the time in which I exist, without demanding that the future confirm its importance, and without regarding the possibility that everything may one day be forgotten as a defeat. Death takes away our future, not the fact that we have had a past. It is a distinction that saves us from nothing, and precisely for that reason seems to me worth taking seriously. It does not restore lost time, necessarily ease the pain of separation, or promise any reward. It simply prevents us from confusing disappearance with the negation of what has been.
One day, the house in which we live will belong to someone else. Our possessions will be divided, sold, perhaps thrown away. The piano we have played for years will pass beneath other hands, and whoever comes to own it may know nothing of us. The names attached to our photographs will be lost, the records of our lives will become indecipherable, and those who loved us will themselves be gone.
There is no necessary injustice in any of this. It is the ordinary fate of everything that belongs to time.
And yet, however completely every trace may disappear, the hours spent at that piano will have been no less real, nor the music we played any less music.
The world will be under no obligation to remember.
And we will not need it to remember for any of it to have happened.